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A primary focus of research undertaken by social psychologists is to establish why perceivers 
fail to accurately adopt or understand other people’s perspectives. From overestimating the 
dispositional bases of behavior to misinterpreting the motivations of out-group members, 
the message that emerges from this work is that social perception is frequently imperfect. 
In contrast, researchers from disciplines outside social psychology seek to identify the 
strategies and skill sets required to successfully understand other people’s perspectives. These 
investigations attempt to identify the mechanisms through which perceivers intuit mental states 
that underlie behavior (e.g. wants, motivations, beliefs). In this article, we review fi ndings from 
perspective-taking research in developmental psychology, primatology (i.e. primate cognition) 
and cognitive neuroscience. We then discuss why understanding how accurate perspective-
taking occurs may inform understanding of when and why this process fails.   
keywords intentionality, person perception, perspective taking, social cognition, social cognitive 
neuroscience, social neuroscience, Theory of Mind (ToM)
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Common-sense psychology works so well it disappears. 
(Fodor, 1987, p. 3)
Among the many contributions that social psych-
ologists have made to the fi eld of psychology, the 
identifi cation of a slew of attributional biases 
that people exhibit is among the most prominent 
(Gilovich, 1993; Gilovich, Griffi n, & Kahneman, 
2002; Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross, Greene, & 
House, 1977). As these fi ndings readily attest, 
people’s judgments and beliefs are colored in 
a variety of ways. Of considerable interest to re-
searchers who study social perception is how 
these biases taint the process by which people 
explain the behavior of self and others (Heider, 
1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Harris, 1967; 
H.H. Kelley, 1967; Ross, 1977). By all accounts, 
there appears to be a huge discrepancy between 
how perceivers make sense of other people’s 
behavior and how they intuit what motivates 
their own actions ( Jones & Nisbett, 1971; H.H. 
Kelley, 1967). Specifi cally, they tend to attribute 
other people’s behavior to dispositional factors, 
while they see their own actions as being heavily 
infl uenced by the constraints of the situation. 
The infl uence this work had on social psychology 
cannot be overstated. One of the fundamental 
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questions that has captivated the attention of 
social psychologists in the 40 years since Jones 
and Davis (1965) is, ‘Why do people go awry 
when attempting to explain behavior?’
In light of the serious social consequences that 
arise from this bias, it is of little surprise that 
social psychologists have poured tremendous 
energy into elucidating its causes and identifying 
factors that encourage people to construe 
behavior more accurately. Among other things, 
the tendency to overestimate dispositional factors 
and underestimate situational constraints leads 
perceivers to make erroneous judgments about 
people’s attitudes and beliefs ( Jones & Davis, 
1965; Jones & Harris, 1967), their capabilities 
(Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977), and their 
traits and dispositions (Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & 
Maracek, 1973; for a review, see Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995). Furthermore, the tendency to 
overweight dispositional explanations and under-
weight situational ones is exacerbated when the 
target in question is from a stereotyped social 
group (Pettigrew, 1979). 
One consequence of this emphasis, however, 
is that it neglects the frequency with which per-
ceivers correctly intuit hidden mental states 
underlying behavior, and undervalues the skill 
required to comprehend intangible psychological 
states. Such an oversight is unfortunate since 
considering the underlying beliefs, proclivities 
and mental states of another is believed to be a 
cardinal mental capacity distinguishing humans 
from other social species (Tomasello, 1997; 
Tomasello & Call, 1997). Moreover, considering 
how social attribution processes are successfully 
realized might constrain the social psychological 
models used to explain when and why people 
fail at this task.
Quite how humans effectively and effi ciently 
ascribe mental states to other entities has been 
a topic of central importance to researchers 
in developmental psychology, primatology 
(i.e. primate cognition) and cognitive neuro-
science for nearly 30 years. In general, researchers 
from these areas believe that to understand 
others’ behavior in terms of invisible mental 
states like ‘see’, ‘believe’, ‘want’ and ‘know’, one 
needs to employ a folk psychology or a Theory 
of Mind (ToM)—an understanding of others 
as psychological beings having mental states 
and intentions that relate to their behavior 
(Leslie, 1987; Meltzoff, 1995; Perner, 1991; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 1990). 
The primary goal of research in these fi elds 
has been identifying the mechanisms through 
which perceivers (both human and non-human 
primates) ascribe causal mental states to others’ 
actions. In this article we review fi ndings on 
the development of perspective-taking skills 
in humans, the homologues of these skills in 
non-human primates, and the biological under-
pinnings of these mechanisms. We conclude 
with a discussion of how fi ndings from these dis-
ciplines might provide insight into when and 
why misattributions occur. 
Identifying goal-directed action
Despite the apparent ease with which humans 
appear to make sense of other people’s behavior, 
there are a number of signifi cant obstacles 
that must be overcome before one can ascribe 
meaning to people’s actions and identify 
the psychological causes of their behavior. Before 
one can even begin to decode the hidden mental 
states underlying another’s action, one must fi rst 
determine whether or not the witnessed behavior 
is intentional. This is particularly important in 
social interactions because how we respond to 
someone’s actions (e.g. Brenda spilling water 
on your lap) hinges on whether we perceive the 
person as having intended the outcome (e.g. you 
wearing soaked slacks) or whether we think they 
had another goal in mind when they initiated 
the act (e.g. acquiring the salt placed just behind 
your water glass). Not only do our ascriptions of 
intentionality dictate how we respond to others’ 
actions, they also determine how we construe 
and remember people’s behavior. Evidence indi-
cates that how we organize and attend to some-
one’s movements largely depends on the goals 
we ascribe to their actions (Malle & Knobe, 1997; 
Zadny & Gerard, 1974; for a review see Baldwin & 
Baird, 2001). Rather than encode every minute 
movement a person makes, we parse the endless 
stream of motion they exhibit into meaningful 
chunks of behavior. As several researchers have 
demonstrated, these ‘chunks’—what the system 
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considers meaningful—translate roughly into 
goals (Baird & Baldwin, 2001; Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993; Newtson, 1973; Newston & Engquist, 1976; 
Schank & Abelson, 1977). It seems, therefore, 
that any complete understanding of how humans 
make sense of other people must incorporate 
an explanation of how perceivers ascribe inten-
tionality to other people’s actions (Malle, 1999; 
Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). 
What clues do perceivers rely on to determine 
when someone is acting in an intentional 
manner? Available evidence indicates that per-
ceivers search for clues that indicate the observed 
action is related to a pre-existing goal. If little 
is previously known about either the target or 
the conditions that have given rise to a particu-
lar behavior, people base their assessments of 
volition on cues that the target’s actions are (or 
are not) unfolding in relation to an object that 
has captured their interest (Baron-Cohen, 1994, 
1995; Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 1992). In 
other words, perceivers look for evidence that 
the action has a purpose or is about something 
and—equally important—that the agent is 
conscious of his or her actions. Of the possible 
cues people exploit to assess which objects in 
the environment are of interest to someone and 
to determine sentience, how the target indi-
vidual allocates their attention, through posture 
and head and gaze direction, appears to be 
particularly useful (Argyle & Cook, 1976; 
Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Ellsworth & Ludwig, 
1972; Kleinke, 1986; Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 
2000). Perceivers tend to use head orientation 
and gaze direction when disambiguating the 
intentions underlying someone’s behavior 
(Phillips et al., 1992), trying to understand com-
plex social messages (Baron-Cohen, 1995), or 
when determining whether there is something 
of immediate interest in the environment that 
requires action (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & 
Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999). 
Findings from cognitive neuroscience
Given the survival value in being able to rapidly 
detect the locus of another’s interest, be it a 
potential mate or a predator, it is of little surprise 
that the human brain evolved a specialized 
system for detecting attention cues in others, 
for computing the direction of attention from 
these cues, and for ascribing meaning to subtle 
changes in head, gaze and posture direction (see 
Langton et al., 2000). Functional brain imaging 
data (both Positron Emission Tomography and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging) indicate 
that specialized visual mechanisms for detect-
ing cues of engagement (e.g. eye gaze direction) 
and intentional movement exist in the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000; 
Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; see 
Langton et al., 2000). Interestingly, these mech-
anisms are quite sophisticated; they appear to 
be responsive not just to the physical properties 
contained in faces and eyes, but to the meaning 
they convey. For example, Pelphrey, Viola, and
McCarthy (2003) found that the blood-
oxygenation-level depending (BOLD) signal 
observed in this region as participants watched 
an animated man walk toward them (participants 
were wearing virtual reality goggles) depended 
not simply on how much the eyes moved but on 
the social meaning conveyed by the eye shifts. 
The response of the STS region to the ani-
mated man was much stronger when the target 
communicated social engagement, shifting his 
attention toward the participant, rather than 
social disengagement, when the man averted his 
eyes from the participant. As a number of brain 
imaging studies have demonstrated, this region 
seems to play a role in processing higher-level 
visual information that signals where other 
people’s interest lies.
Findings from single cell recordings in 
non-human primates
Perhaps the most compelling demonstrations that 
the brain has evolved specialized mechanisms 
that code for attention and intentional action 
in others have emerged from studies that have 
used electrophysiological techniques (with non-
human primates). Consistent with the fi ndings 
obtained in functional brain imaging studies 
with humans, Perrett and colleagues (1985; 
Perrett, Mistlin, & Chitty 1989; Perrett, Heitanen, 
Oram, Benson, & Rolls, 1992; see Emery, 2000 
for review) found a distinct population of cells 
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in the macaque STS that was selective to changes 
in head orientation (i.e. the cells responded 
vigorously to changes in head direction but not 
to changes in the orientation of other objects), 
leading them to suggest that these cells enable an 
analysis of social attention, or signal where other 
individuals are directing their attention. What 
makes their proposal particularly compelling 
is that a portion of these cells appear to code 
for the abstract concept of ‘attention in others’. 
For example, a cell that codes for ‘attention 
being directed away’ from the observing monkey 
will fi re to any orientation of the target’s head 
except a direct frontal view. If, however, the 
target head is displayed with a direct frontal 
view and the target averts its eyes to the left or 
to the right, the inhibition on the cell will be 
lifted. What this then suggests is that these cells 
rely on a conjunction of head, gaze and posture 
cues to determine another’s referential intent 
(see Jellema, Baker, Wicker, & Perrett, 2000; 
Perret et al., 1989, 1992; Wachsmuth, Oram, & 
Perrett, 1994). 
But cells in this region do not just code for 
the locus of others’ attention; evidence indi-
cates that there are populations of cells in the 
STS that are selective to limb movements in 
certain directions (e.g. reaching toward an 
object; presenting an object, etc. Perrett et al., 
1985, 1998). Importantly, these cells are sensi-
tive to the relationship between hand/limb 
movements and target objects. A manipulated 
action in the absence of a target object (e.g. pre-
tending to grab an invisible cup) will not elicit 
fi ring in these cells; the cells’ fi ring rate depends 
on the goal of the action ( Jellema etal., 2000; 
Perrett et al., 1989). Particularly relevant to the 
present discussion is evidence that the fi ring 
patterns of cells that are responsive to the sight 
of hand and limb movements are conditional 
on the direction of attention of the agent per-
forming the reaching. For example, a cell in the 
observing monkey that responds to an experi-
menter reaching out and grabbing an object will 
exhibit a reduced response if the experimenter 
performs the exact same action but attends away 
from the target object. This is taken as evidence 
that cell populations in the STS play a role in 
inferring the intentionality of animate actions 
by integrating higher-level visual information 
about the direction of attention and actions 
in others.  
Findings from developmental psychology
It is widely believed among developmental 
psychologists that before a child can ascribe inten-
tionality to another’s behavior, they must possess 
an awareness that people have a psychological 
relationship with the objects that capture their 
interest and that the movements people make 
in relation to these objects are about something 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, 1994a). Put differ-
ently, they must come to understand that there 
is a psychological reason people engage (e.g. look 
at, grab, etc.) with things in their environment. 
Leslie (1994a) has suggested the capacity to 
construe people as perceiving the environment 
and pursuing goals emerges after children ap-
preciate that when people engage with things 
in their environment, they are doing something 
meaningful. 
Consistent with the possibility that the system 
for detecting intentionality is innate or ‘hard-
wired’ is evidence that precursor perspective-
taking skills emerge very early in infancy (see 
Baron-Cohen, 1994, 1995). Soon after birth, 
young infants are more likely to follow, and are 
more persistent in following, face-like shapes 
relative to other objects ( Johnson, Dziurawiec, 
Ellis, & Morton, 1991). Faces communicating 
social engagement elicit enhanced neural pro-
cessing in newborns (Farroni, Csbira, Simon, & 
Johnson, 2002) and 6-month-olds look two to 
three times longer at a face with gaze directed 
at them than to one looking away (Papousek & 
Papousek & Papousek, 1979). By 9-months of age, 
most babies can make and maintain eye contact 
with their care providers and by 12-months, 
look reliably to where someone else is looking 
(Corkum & Moore, 1995; Hood, Willen, & Driver, 
1998; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). These fi ndings 
are interpreted as evidence that children are 
born predisposed to attend to information that 
is useful for assessing agency (Baron-Cohen, 
1995). 
Not only do infants appear to be born with an 
attraction to cues that signal intentionality, from 
a very early age they exhibit consummate skill 
219
Mason and Macrae perspective-taking
at identifying the goals underlying people’s 
actions. Woodward (1998) demonstrated that 
5 month-olds habituate slower to a change in the 
goal of an action (i.e. what an agent is reaching 
toward) than to a change in the trajectory of an 
agent’s reach toward an object, implying that, 
at this age, children are sensitive to the inten-
tions that underlie people’s movements. In 
a similar vein, Meltzoff (1995) demonstrated 
that 18-month-olds will re-enact what an adult 
intended to do (an intended action that failed 
or was never accomplished) rather than what the 
adult actually did, and that this was in contrast 
to the pattern of re-enactment they exhibited 
when watching a mechanical arm move in a 
goal-directed manner. Not only are they able to 
detect basic goals like reaching from an early age, 
recent evidence indicates that by 1 year of age, 
infants integrate information about the nature 
of the action with information about the identity 
or function of the object when perceiving others’ 
behavior. For example, Spaepen and Spelke 
(2007) demonstrated that infants perceive a per-
son reaching for a daisy as having the same basic 
goal as a person reaching for a rose (i.e. they con-
strue goals in terms of the target object’s basic 
level—‘fl ower’). 
Furthermore, by the age of 2 children con-
sistently utilize cues communicating people’s 
referential intent. At 18 months, most children 
begin to expect that when a person expresses 
positivity toward an object (e.g., they look 
and smile at it), they will approach or act on 
the object that elicited this response (Spelke, 
Phillips, & Woodward, 1995). Similarly, Baldwin 
and colleagues (Baldwin, 1991, 1993; Baldwin & 
Moses, 1994) have demonstrated that 20-month 
olds understand that when a caregiver pro-
vides a verbal label for a target object (e.g. ‘That 
is an ‘apple’, Mary’) they are a referring to the 
item that they are currently attending to and 
not to some more perceptually salient stimulus 
in the environment (e.g. a clown hovering in 
the corner). By the second year of life children 
exhibit a firm understanding that people’s 
movements are the instantiation of a goal and 
not simply a sequence of meaningless events 
(Woodward & Markam, 1998; see Leslie, 1994b, 
p. 213, for a discussion of this issue). 
Perspective-taking
Success in social interactions hinges on more 
than an awareness that people engage with their 
environment for psychological reasons and 
the capacity to detect intentional acts, however. 
To understand the behavior of others and 
effectively interact with them—to anticipate 
how they might react to something you say, for 
example—one must have insight into what they 
believe, think and feel and understand how these 
mental states relate to behavior. 
How people use situational and dispositional 
factors to model another’s perspective, and 
how they use the model to understand and pre-
dict behavior, are topics that have received 
burgeoning interest in developmental psychology, 
primatology and cognitive neuroscience over the 
last 30 years. Indeed, the scope of this work 
is too extensive to cover in detail in a single 
review article. In the current article we remain 
agnostic about which model best accounts for 
how people develop a ToM and focus instead 
on reviewing critical fi ndings directly relevant 
to social attribution and highlighting hotly 
debated questions, such as whether non-human 
primates have a ToM and when children fi rst 
exhibit the capacity to model other people’s 
physical and mental perspectives. We point 
interested readers to excellent reviews for wider 
consideration of these issues (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Flavell, 1999; Frith & Frith, 1999; Mitchell, 
Mason, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Povinelli, 1993; 
Stone, 2006; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Wellman 
& Gelman, 1992).
Findings from primate cognition 
(comparative psychology)
In attempting to reconstruct the evolution of 
the human mind, primatologists have sought 
to establish precisely when social attribution 
emerged in the primate order, what environ-
mental pressures may have contributed to the 
evolution of this ability, and what cognitive 
capacities are precursors to this skill. Among 
primatologists, it is generally believed that as 
primates began to live in larger coalitions, they 
were confronted by unique social challenges 
and that they adapted to these complexities by 
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evolving specialized strategies for interacting 
with conspecifi cs (Byrne & Whiten, 1988, 1990; 
for a review see Dunbar, 2003). In other words, 
primate intelligence developed as a response 
to a selective pressure for social expertise 
(Humphrey, 1976). 
Results from primate studies generally suggest 
that the capacity for mental state attribution 
evolved quite recently in the history of the pri-
mate order leaving, as Povinelli described it, 
‘two fundamentally distinct groups of life: those 
who know that the mental world exists and those 
who do not’ (1993, p. 494). For the most part, 
primatologists argue that chimpanzees and 
(possibly) apes are the only non-human primates 
who ‘know about the mental world’ and exhi-
bit rudimentary perspective-taking behavior 
(de Waal, 1991; Gallup, 1982; Povinelli, 1993; 
Whiten & Byrne, 1991). Although there continues 
to be considerable debate regarding this issue, 
most contend that the rest of the primate species 
(i.e. monkeys) behave and interact with each 
other in a purely non-mentalisitic manner. They 
can make associations between observable cues 
(e.g. another monkey directing its attention 
toward a tree) and a related behavior (e.g. the 
monkey climbing up the tree toward a dangling 
banana), but they never explicitly consider 
the cause underlying the agent’s actions (e.g. 
the animal was famished) or use mentalistic 
state concepts to predict what others might do 
(see Heyes, 1998).
In their quest to assess the presence of 
perspective-taking faculties in non-human 
primates, primatologists have spent consider-
able time exploring the relationship between 
self-awareness and ToM reasoning. This is in no 
small part attributable to the impact of Gallup’s 
(1970) demonstration that chimpanzees have 
self-recognition (they touched a dot of odorless 
red paint strategically placed on their forehead 
while they were anesthetized, when confronted 
by a mirror). In considering the implications 
of these fi ndings, Gallup (1970, 1982) suggested 
that self-recognition is an indication of self-
awareness, or the capacity of an organism to re-
fl ect on its own existence. Furthermore, he 
argued that introspection makes it possible for 
humans and chimpanzees to reason about their 
mental experiences and to speculate about 
the hidden mental states of others (Gallup, 
1982; Meltzoff, 1995; see Povinelli, 1993 for a 
review). Subsequent to Gallup’s (1970) study, 
it was demonstrated that the capacity for 
self-recognition is also present in orangutans 
(Lethmate & Ducker, 1973) and absent in more 
than 20 species of monkeys, including gorillas 
(Ledbetter & Basen, 1982; see Povinelli, 1987 
however). Although these mirror-guided self-
inspection fi ndings are widely interpreted as 
refl ecting the potential for select non-human 
primates to imagine themselves as others see 
them, this construal continues to be challenged 
on grounds that these demonstrations only prove 
these animals posses a ‘body concept’ (Heyes, 
1998; but see Gallup, 1983). 
Although Gallup’s (1970) interpretations 
continue to be challenged, the results of several 
investigations are consistent with his suggestion 
that animals with the capacity to introspect 
possess rudimentary ToM skills. In a series 
of landmark studies, Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) found evidence that chimpanzees 
have an awareness of others’ mental states and 
that they can use this information to adopt 
the viewpoint of another entity. Premack and 
Woodruff showed chimpanzee, Sarah, movies of 
human actors attempting to accomplish various 
tasks (e.g. escape from a cage). Before the movie 
reached completion (i.e. before the task was 
accomplished by the actor), the experimenters 
would stop the tape and administer a forced-
choice paradigm prompting Sarah to choose 
between two images—one that portrayed the 
solution to the current dilemma and a second 
that portrayed the solution to a different 
problem. Remarkably, Sarah picked the correct 
image at better than chance levels, indicating 
that she could intuit the goal underlying the ex-
perimenter’s movements and identify the most 
appropriate means for attaining the desired 
outcome (see also Povinelli, Nelson & Boysen, 
1990; Uller & Nichols, 2000).
Not only do primates exhibit an awareness 
of people’s goals, a recent study by Warneken 
and Tomasello (2006) suggests that young chim-
panzees will spontaneously volunteer assistance 
to an experimenter attempting a task that cannot 
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be accomplished alone (e.g., the chimpanzees 
handed the experimenter items that were beyond 
the experimenter’s reach). What is particularly 
remarkable is that this assistance appears to 
be contingent on the experimenter’s current 
mental state. If the experimenter consciously 
dropped something and made no attempt to 
pick it up, the chimpanzee did not move to assist. 
However, if the experimenter feigned ignorance 
of the dropped object, the chimpanzee would 
retrieve the item for the experimenter (see also 
Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
It is important to note that not all of the 
scripted predicaments were met with the chim-
panzee’s unsolicited help. In fact, none of the 
tasks that required the chimpanzee to move a 
physical obstacle (e.g. open a cabinet door so 
that the experimenter could put an armful of 
books inside) were met by the animal’s assist-
ance. Rather than interpret this as evidence 
that chimpanzees lack the motivation to behave 
altruistically in these circumstances, they pro-
pose the animals lack the sophistication to 
intuit the need for assistance across varying goals, 
actions and situations. When Warneken and 
Tomasello (2006) compared the incidence of 
altruistic behavior of these chimpanzees to young 
human infants, they discovered that, although 
our nearest primate relatives exhibit the capacity 
to infer goals and an innate motivation to help, 
their cooperative dispositions are far surpassed 
by human infants, who helped regardless of 
the task context (see also Warneken, Chen, & 
Tomasello, 2006).1
Complementing fi ndings from the labora-
tory are documented examples of non-human 
primates exhibiting behaviors indicative of 
rudimentary perspective-taking faculties in their 
natural social environments. For example, fi eld 
studies have reported that when two chimpanzees 
recently embroiled in confl ict exhibit reluctance 
to reconcile their differences, a third party will 
occasionally initiate reconciliation by leading 
one opponent to the other (Cheney & Seyfarth, 
1986; Cheyney, Seyfarth, & Smuts, 1986). There 
are several documented examples of non-human 
primates exhibiting cooperative behavior, which 
requires one to recognize that a task requires col-
laboration and that one has the capacity to work 
collectively to solve a problem (de Waal, 1982; 
Boesch & Boesch, 1990). In fact, recent evidence 
indicates that before launching a cooperative 
endeavor, chimps will assess the collaborative cap-
acities (e.g. the knowledge base, skill set) of 
potential teammates. For example, Melis, Hare, 
and Tomasello (2006) recently demonstrated 
that when confronted by a task that requires 
cooperation, chimpanzees solicit help from 
the most effective partners (e.g. the one that 
demonstrated the highest success rate on the 
previous day). 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence that 
non-human primates spontaneously model 
the perspectives of others is their use of tactical 
deception. The know-how to mislead, direct 
and subtly manipulate others for personal 
gain—‘Machiavellian intelligence’ (Humphrey, 
1976: Whiten & Byrne, 1988, 1997)—is believed 
to have emerged as a consequence of living in 
complex social groups, where competition for 
limited resources can be avoided if an animal mis-
represents a situation, using its normal behavioral 
repertoire, in such away that is advantageous to 
the animal (Byrne & Whiten, 1988). Evidence 
indicates this phenomenon is actually wide-
spread in non-human primates (Whiten & Byrne, 
1988), who commonly conceal things they value 
by hiding them or by inhibiting interest in the 
item, particularly if they are in the presence of 
a higher ranking monkey. Hare and colleagues 
(Hare, Call, & Tomasello, in press), for example, 
have evidence that non-human primates take 
extra caution to retrieve food they know others 
are unaware of. Santos, Nissen, & Ferrugia, 
(2007) have demonstrated that rhesus monkeys 
know what others can hear and—if given an 
option—will choose treats from a container that 
makes less noise when overturned.
It is also common for non-human primates to 
strategically attract another monkey’s attention 
with calls or to distract their attention from 
something desirable using points or looks 
(Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten & Byrne, 1988). 
Woodruff and Premack (1979) demonstrated that 
chimpanzees selectively deceive competitors—
directing them away from an overturned con-
tainer concealing food by pointing to one that is 
empty, and helping cooperating experimenters 
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who share food by pointing to the container 
with the hidden treat. Finally, there is anecdotal 
evidence that chimpanzees strategically hide 
cues that might expose inopportune mental 
states. For example, de Waal (1982) described a 
chimpanzee that hid an external manifestation 
of fear (a fear grin) from another chimpanzee 
with whom he was in a dominance struggle, by 
placing his hand over his mouth. At the very least, 
these fi ndings suggest the animals have physical 
perspective-taking skills (i.e. they know what 
others see is important), they understand that 
other animals share interests in certain items, 
and they have the wherewithal to casually and 
subtly manipulate another’s behavior by giving 
them false impressions (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; 
Cheney et al., 1986; Whiten & Byrne, 1988).
Findings from developmental psychology
Paralleling the progress primatologists have 
made in specifying when precursors of mental 
state attribution emerged in the phylogenic 
order (and which social factors created selective 
pressure for this capacity), developmental 
psychologists have made considerable headway 
in understanding the ontogeny of these skills 
in human infants. Over the last three decades, 
they have advanced our understanding of when 
the precursors of these skills emerge, which 
general cognitive capacities need to be in place 
for mental attribution skills to develop (see 
Wellman, 1990; Perner, 1991 for a review), and 
which particular mental states infants develop 
an awareness of fi rst (e.g. Hadwin & Perner, 
1991; Wellman, 1990). 
Among developmental psychologists it is 
generally assumed that young children are born 
cognitively egocentric, or unaware that people—
including themselves—have differing physical 
and mental perspectives (cf. Flavell, 1999). 
Before the age of 3, children generally fail at tasks 
that require ‘person-reading’—assessments of 
another’s desires or beliefs (Flavell & Miller, 1998; 
Fodor, 1992; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Leslie, 
1987). This incapacity is apparent in the problems 
children have with perspective-taking tasks, 
such as the False Belief Paradigm (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). In perhaps the most popular 
version of this task a child is shown a box of 
candies and asked what the box contains. After 
the child responds, ‘candy’ the experimenter 
reveals to the child that, in fact, the box con-
tains crayons. The experimenter then asks the 
child what another child, who has not yet been 
shown the true contents of the box, thinks it 
contains. Most 5- year-olds asked this question 
understand that just as they were deceived by the 
appearance of the crayon container, others will 
guess that the box contains ‘candy’. In contrast, 
the majority of 3-year-olds respond ‘crayons’. 
This is evidence that at this stage children are 
unaware that people can have beliefs that are 
false or inconsistent with reality (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). Not only do they fail to 
recognize this about others, when prompted to 
indicate what they had initially believed was in 
the candy box, most 3-year-olds reply, ‘crayons’, 
suggesting that they have diffi culty constructing 
even their own past perspectives (cf. Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988). 
Although at age 3 most children still struggle 
to construe others in terms of mental states like 
beliefs, the precursors of this capacity actually 
emerge when children are infants. Within the 
fi rst few months of life, infants begin to follow 
the direction of an adult care provider’s line of 
gaze (Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Between 6 and 
18 months, they begin to exhibit ‘checking be-
havior’, alternating their viewpoint between 
the caregiver and the direction in which the 
caregiver is attending (Butterworth & Jarrett, 
1991). Once these skills are polished, chil-
dren begin to establish joint visual attention 
(i.e. shared experiences of another object) 
and strategically manipulate the attention of 
others. Around 10 months, infants begin to use 
communicative gestures like pointing (Franco & 
Butterworth, 1996) and exhibit behaviors—like 
social referencing (Striano & Rochat, 2000). This 
indicates that they are aware people have mental 
states (e.g. desires) about objects to which they 
attend (Baron-Cohen, 1994; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1977). They also begin to act on objects in a 
manner consistent with other people’s wants and 
needs (e.g. they will complete tasks that others 
initiated but failed to complete), suggesting 
they are able to intuit other people’s inten-
tions (Baldwin & Moses, 1996; Behne, Carpenter, 
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Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Meltzoff, 1995; Repacholi 
& Gopnik, 1997; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; 
Woodward, 1998).
By 1 year, children exhibit an increased cap-
acity to reason non-egocentrically. They begin to 
engage in spontaneous role-taking and pretend 
play, both of which require children to put them-
selves in another’s psychological perspective 
(Leslie, 1994b). Eighteen month-old children 
seem to be aware that people vary with respect 
to desires and wants. For example, Repacholi 
and Gopnik (1997) demonstrated that when 
prompted to feed a caregiver one of two food 
options, 18 month-old children will choose 
the item (e.g. broccoli) that they witnessed the 
caregiver responding positively toward (smil-
ing at it) on a previous occasion, even though 
they themselves prefer the alternative item 
(e.g. crackers). Importantly, children appear able 
to construe others in terms of wants, needs and 
desires long before they construe them in terms 
of either true or false beliefs (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995; Wellman, 1990). This asymmetry in time 
may arise because beliefs involve interpretations 
of the world whereas desires simply reflect 
people’s attitudes toward things (i.e. they are 
non-representational; Astington & Gopnik, 
1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Indeed, many 
people have suggested that ‘desire psychology’ 
is a precursor to ‘belief psychology’ (Wellman, 
1990). It is not until the age of 4 or 5 that a 
child’s capacity to explain another’s behavior in 
terms of what they believe (e.g. Curtis ran out 
of gasoline because he (mistakenly) thought his 
tank was full) begins to rival with their capacity 
to explain people in terms of desire states 
(cf. Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). Soon after, they 
begin to attribute personalities, mental states and 
emotions to Heider and Simmel (1944) shapes 
almost as readily as their adult counterparts 
(Berry & Springer, 1993) and exhibit an under-
standing that at a single moment in time people 
can have competing desires (Rakoczy, Warneken, 
& Tomasello, 2007).
Findings from cognitiven neuroscience
In the last fi ve years, it has become increas-
ingly common for researchers to use functional 
brain imaging techniques to understand more 
about how perspective-taking occurs within 
the brain. The ultimate goal of this work is to 
specify which strategies people use to make 
sense of other people’s behavior (see Flavell, 
1999 for a discussion of three popular theories 
of ToM development) and to ground these 
psychological models in neurobiology. At this 
stage, researchers have implicated a number 
of brain regions in mentalizing (e.g. temporo-
parietal junction, TPJ; STS; and medial pre-
frontal cortex, mPFC); however, it is still not 
clear what particular functions each of these 
regions subserve (for reviews, see Amodio & 
Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 1999; Gallagher & 
Frith, 2003). As discussed in the previous sec-
tion on intentionality ascription, it is likely 
that the STS plays a critical role in integrating 
cues indicative of intentional movement and 
ascribing meaning to them. Consistent with this 
possibility, several studies have reported activity 
in this area when people engage in mental state 
attribution (e.g. Gallagher et al., 2000; Grezes, 
Frith, & Passingham, 2004). 
While there is considerable debate about 
exactly how people infer hidden mental states 
(see Flavell, 1999; Saxe, Moran, Scholz, & 
Gabrieli, 2006), in as much as mentalizing in-
volves using the self as a basis for generating a 
psychological model for another (i.e. simulation; 
Harris, 1992; see Gallup, 1985), one would expect 
the involvement of the medial prefrontal cortices 
(W. M. Kelley et al., 2002; Macrae, Moran, 
Heatherton, Banfi eld, & Kelley, 2003; Mitchell, 
Banaji, & Macrae, 2005a; for review see Amodio & 
Frith, 2006). There is some evidence consistent 
with this possibility. Goel, Grafman, Sadato, & 
Hallett (1995) reported fi nding greater activity 
in this region when their participants assessed 
whether certain historical fi gures would know 
how to use specifi c technologies (e.g. Would a 
contemporary of Christopher Columbus know 
how to use a compass versus a CD player?). Both 
Gallagher et al. (2000) and Brunet, Sarfati, 
Hardy-Bayle, and Decety (2000) found greater 
activity in this region when people attributed 
intentions to characters depicted in cartoons, 
whereas Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith (2000) 
reported greater activity in this region, in the 
STS and in the TPJ when participants attributed 
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mental states to animated objects. More recently, 
it has been demonstrated that the mPFC is 
recruited when participants refl ect on people 
performing various actions (Mason, Banfi eld, & 
Macrae, 2004) or on people’s psychological states 
(Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005b). Evidence 
also indicates that this region is recruited when 
people attempt to ‘outsmart’ an opponent in a 
game of ‘rock, paper, scissors’ (Gallagher, Jack, 
Roepstorff, & Frith, 2002; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, 
Smith, & Trouard, 2001) or when they play games 
that require an assessment of the cooperative 
intent of others (e.g. the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
the Ultimatum Game; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, 
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004). While further research 
is needed to clarify how each of these areas con-
tributes to the perspective-taking process and 
whether these mechanisms are specifi c to mental 
state attribution, grounding these mechanisms 
in functional neuroanatomy will likely lead to a 
more complete understanding of how we detect 
intentional acts and construe them in terms of 
mental states.
One obvious question is whether there are any 
known cases of individuals with impairments in 
perspective taking. It has been suggested that 
impaired mentalizing is one of the hallmark 
features of autism (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Unlike their 
healthy infant counterparts, autistic infants 
show little interest in social stimuli such as 
faces (Osterling & Dawson, 1994). They never 
exhibit a tendency to orient in the direction in 
which another is attending (Dawson, Meltzoff, 
Osterling, Rinaldi, & Brown, 1998) nor do they 
manipulate other people’s attention through 
pointing (Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer, & Sherman, 
1986). In fact, they appear to go to great lengths 
to avoid social engagement altogether (Hobson & 
Lee, 1998). In contrast to healthy children, who 
begin to exhibit pretend play and demonstrate 
some understanding of pretense at around 2 
years of age, autistic children never engage in 
imaginative play (Roeyers & van Berckelaer-
Onnes, 1994). While normal children begin to 
exhibit an understanding that people can believe 
things that are inconsistent with reality at the age 
of 3 or 4, it is typical for autistic children to fail 
at false belief tasks well into their teens (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986). In attempting to 
characterize the impairments exhibited by indi-
viduals with autism (e.g. impaired empathic 
thinking, an absence of self-consciousness, an 
inability to detect sarcasm), several researchers 
have suggested that autistics never develop a 
complete ToM and consequently treat people 
as if they were objects (e.g. Phillips, Gomez, & 
Baron-Cohen, S., 1995). Although they have 
some success construing others in terms of 
desires and needs, they are severely impaired 
with tasks that involve belief attribution (Baron-
Cohen, 1991). Although it remains open to 
debate, most researchers would agree that 
the mentalizing impairments autistic children 
exhibit are independent of other general 
cognitive abilities (e.g. Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) 
and refl ect a specifi c impairment in mental state 
attribution. 
Conclusion
What do the fi ndings from studies that have 
taken a developmental, comparative or cognitive 
neuroscience approach to social attribution have 
to offer social psychology? One obvious answer 
is a means of constraining our theories of how 
people explain the behavior of others. 
Developmental psychology is particularly use-
ful in providing insight into the nature of mental 
state attribution in the absence of environmental 
infl uences. By taking a developmental approach, 
one can examine which social mechanisms and 
tendencies people are born with and which are 
learned. Just as importantly, it provides a good 
means for assessing how perspective-taking skills 
evolve in relation to developing language and 
working memory capacities, or whether ‘per-
son reading’ depends on general cognitive 
faculties (cf. Perner & Lang, 1999). Furthermore, 
it seems reasonable to suspect that the pattern 
of errors that young children make when at-
tributing mental states to others bears some 
resemblance to the biases exhibited by adults. 
Given evidence that ‘belief psychology’ is more 
sophisticated or computationally diffi cult than 
‘desire psychology’ (e.g. Wellman, 1990), one 
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might reasonably expect, for example, that 
people are more likely to misconstrue actions 
when they are motivated by representation 
states, such as beliefs. Having knowledge of the 
ontogeny of perspective-taking skills sheds light 
on why perceivers struggle to construe people’s 
responses to the world in terms of what they believe 
it is rather than what it actually is (Gopnik & 
Astington, 1988; Perner, 1991). 
The current article also reviews research on 
social attribution skills in non-human primates. 
In general, the results of these studies suggest 
that the ability to infer goals and to intuit 
perspectives is present in rudimentary form in 
some non-human primates. In contrast to hu-
mans, the mentalizing skills observed in our 
closest evolutionary relatives emerged in the 
absence of language or formal training. As such, 
comparative work provides a means for assessing 
these skills when they are fully developed, absent 
obscuring cultural infl uences (Yerkes, 1943). 
What is particularly useful about this approach 
is that it makes it possible to reconstruct the 
phylogenetic history of perspective-taking, or 
the evolution of ToM skills across time (see 
Tomasello, 1997; Tomasello & Call, 1997). 
One can therefore isolate components of 
ToM reasoning and determine how the skill 
impacted the survival and reproductive success 
of the animal over time. Using the same logic, 
one also gains insight into which social mech-
anisms might have been selected against and why. 
Finally, by considering changes in social living 
arrangements across the phylogenic order—an 
increase in coalition size, for example—one 
gains clues about what adaptations would have 
been necessary.  
Finally, cognitive neuroscience approaches 
provide insight into the biological basis of this 
capacity. Cognitive neuroscience approaches 
are often criticized on the basis that they merely 
tell us ‘where’ in the brain some task takes place 
(e.g. Willingham & Dunn, 2003). Practically 
speaking, knowing ‘where’ these processing 
mechanisms take place can be extremely useful, 
because we already have a working knowledge 
base of the function, connections, and phylogeny 
of a vast number of cortical regions. In a typical 
brain imaging experiment, researchers test 
whether a specific cortical region (e.g. the 
mPFC) is recruited during a particular task 
(e.g. ascribing mental states to others) because 
the area in question has been previously impli-
cated in a process (e.g. self-referencing, introspec-
tion) that is purported to contribute to the task 
(e.g. mental state ascription; Gallup, 1970). In 
other words, even if brain imaging techniques 
only reveal something about ‘where’ the task hap-
pens in the brain, they still have the capacity to 
inform existing psychological models of mental 
state attribution. 
Clearly our interpretations of people’s be-
havior are infl uenced by our nuanced experiences 
(Bartlett, 1932; Goffman, 1974). Dispositionalism 
varies by culture (cf. Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 
1994) and by people’s implicit social beliefs 
(Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). Yet the available 
evidence also suggests that humans may be born 
with specialized systems for detecting agency 
(Leslie, 1994a; Spelke et al., 1995) and innately 
endowed with other mechanisms that facili-
tate their ability to mentalize (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Leslie 1995). ToM in particular appears to 
have a strong genetic component, for it is well 
known that autism is a highly heritable disorder 
(Bailey, Palferman, Heavey, & Le Couteur, 
1998). One central challenge that remains 
is determining which aspects of perspective-
taking are universal and which components are 
shaped by environmental upbringing (Hughes 
et al., 2005; Vinden, 1996; Perner, Ruffman, & 
Leekman, 1994).
We began the present review by suggesting 
that having an understanding of how people 
successfully adopt the viewpoint of another can 
provide insight into the circumstances under 
which they fail. Although the debate over how 
perspective-taking is accomplished continues, 
one popular view among developmental psych-
ologists, primatologists and cognitive neuro-
scientists is that perceivers intuit the motivations 
underlying other people’s actions and predict 
their behavior by first simulating how they 
themselves would think or feel in similar cir-
cumstances and then adapting this mental 
model to account for self-other differences 
which lead to diverging vantage points. If this 
account is valid, one might reasonably expect 
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three general categories of perspective-taking 
errors to emerge. The fi rst class of errors might 
arise when perceivers map their own perspec-
tive onto a target but fail to update the mental 
model to account for important distinguishing 
information and, consequently, overestimate 
the degree to which other people’s viewpoints 
match their own (e.g. the ‘false consensus 
effect’; Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; ‘Keith must 
be shopping at the mall because, like myself, 
he enjoys being up-to-date on the latest fashion 
trends’). A second class of inaccuracies might 
emerge when perceivers have a faulty model to 
begin with; that is, they misidentify the motiv-
ations and beliefs that give rise to the observed 
behavior in themselves and erroneously apply 
their model to infer the mental states underlying 
the behavior of others (e.g. ‘I only eat cookies 
when I am hungry, Bree must be eating cookies 
because she is famished’). Lastly, errors of a third 
type might arise when a target is perceived as 
being so dissimilar from the self that simulation 
is deemed an inappropriate strategy and aban-
doned for rule-based generalizations (e.g. ‘The 
elderly woman must be standing on the street 
corner because she’s lost and confused about 
where she is’; cf. Ames, 2004).  
Whether this taxonomy of errors is meaningful 
ultimately depends on the validity of the simu-
lation account of perspective-taking. The goal in 
using this example was simply to demonstrate that 
understanding the process by which perceivers 
ascribe mental state to other’s behavior is key to 
predicting the outcome of perceivers’ attempts to 
make sense of others, whether their attributions 
are accurate or not. 
Notes
1. Interested readers can fi nd video clips which 
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